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Research Question:
• Contracting during a crisis is replete with challenges. Speed and flexibility are essential 
because delay means urgent needs go unmet. 
• As a result contracts relying on crisis funds (including emergency funds) may bypass 
many safeguards built into normal spending processes. 
• The literature highlights three areas where crisis contracting diverges from 
conventional contracting: noncompetitive awards, undefinitized contract actions, and 
reach-back contracts.
This project analyzes the interaction of these three traits with crisis contract performance 
across three datasets:
• Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funded contracting after the initial withdrawal 
from Iraq,
• American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) contracts responding to the 
global financial crises, and
• Federal government contracts awarded in responses to natural disasters.
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What can we learn from contracting for past crises?
Identified Crisis-Funded Contracts
3
The study team identified 
crisis-funded contracts in 
FPDS:
• Disaster and Recovery 
identification relied 
exclusively on explicit 
contract labels.
• OCO contracting were 
classified using a 
decision tree that also 
included place of 
performance, funding 
account, contracting 
office, and product or 
service category.
Study period for proportion and performance comparison includes contracts begun between 2007 to 
2015.
Hypothesis 1: Crisis-Funded Contracting and Performance
4
Crisis-Funding and Likelihood of Termination 
or Ceiling Breach– Direct Relationship
H1: Crisis-funded contracts are more likely to 
experience poor performance.
Results
H1 was partially upheld. Recovery Act and 
Disaster contracts were more likely to face 
ceiling breaches than conventional contracts 
(odds ratio 2.18 and 1.41 respectively and 
significant at the 0.1 percent and 5 percent 
levels, respectively). OCO contracts were not 
more likely to experience breaches. None of 
the categories were significantly more likely 
to be terminated.
Photo Credit: U.S. Army (2014) “The role of administrative contracting officers” 
Available at: https://www.army.mil/article/132475
Aggravating or Mitigating Factors for Crisis Contracting
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In reviewing the literature, we identified three contracting characteristics of 
relevance to crisis contracting
• Noncompetitive Awards - The ability to bypass competition when awarding 
contracts due to urgency is an important but controversial aspect of contingency 
contracting because competition can lead to delays. 
• Undefinitized Contract Actions - Undefinitized contract actions (UCAs) allow 
production to start without defining all of the terms of the contract.
• Reach-back Contracting – Reach-back contracting allows contracting officers in the 
field to “reach-back” to domestic contracting officers for support in contingency 
operations.
Noncompetitive Awards and Crisis-Funded Contracts
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Share of Obligations by Extent Competed
• Recovery Act obligations achieve robust levels of 
multi-offer competition, 20 percentage points 
higher than other domestic civilian contracting.
• Disaster contracting is competed at rates 
comparable to other domestic civilian contracting 
but below rates for international contracting.
• OCO contracting is competed at rates comparable 
with other international defense contracts and 21 
percentage points higher than domestic defense 
contracting.
• Urgency exceptions are rare across the board, 
though highest for disaster (3.0%), OCO (1.8%), 
and other defense  international contracting 
(1.5%).
Hypothesis 2: Non-Competive Awards and Crisis-
Funded Contracts
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Crisis-Funded Non-Competitive Awards and Likelihood of Termination or Ceiling Breach–
Direct Relationship
H2A: Increasing (decreasing) competition makes poor contract performance less (more) likely 
for crisis-funded contracts.
H2B: The use of urgency exception to competition requirements makes poor crisis-funded 
contract performance more likely.
Results
H2A and H2B were upheld for ceiling breaches but not terminations.
• Relative to contracts competed with 2-4 offers, those with 5 or more offers were found to be 
0.78 times less likely to experience ceiling breaches (significant at the 0.1 percent level). In 
the federal model, these contracts were significantly more likely to experience a contracting 
breach.
• In the crisis-only model, contracts using the urgency exception were breaches were 1.44 
times more to experience ceiling breaches than those competed with 2-4 offers (significant 
at the 0.1 percent level). No relationship was found in the federal model.
UCA and Crisis-Funded Contracts
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Share of Obligations by UCA usage
• At the time of dataset assembly, FPDS failed to 
report whether UCA contracts were employed in 
the later years of the study period.
• Obligations for disaster and Recovery Act 
contracts went to UCAs at rates of 4.6% and 2.8% 
respectively, notably higher than for U.S. civilian 
contracting. 
• OCO contracts diverge in the other direction, with 
UCAs only accounting for 1.2 percent of 
obligations, less than half of the rate for 
international defense contracts and well below 
the rate for domestic defense contracting.
Hypothesis 3: UCA and Crisis-Funded Contracts
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Crisis-Funded UCAs and Likelihood of Termination or Ceiling Breach– Direct Relationship
H3: The use of UCAs makes poor crisis-funded contract performance more likely 
Results
H3 was not upheld. UCA contracts in the federal model were more likely to experience ceiling 
breaches (odds ratio 1.73 significant at the 0.1 percent level) and terminations (odds ratio 2.16 
significant at the 0.1 percent level). However, no significant relationship between UCA and 
likelihood of ceiling breaches or terminations was for crisis-funded contracts.
Reach-Back and Crisis-Funded Contracts
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Proportion of UCA by Dataset• Contracting offices were 
categorized by the proportion 
of their obligations with an 
international place of 
performance.
• Internationally oriented 
contracting offices do little 
taking place domestically and 
vice versa. This relationship is 
stronger for civilian 
contracting.
• Drawdowns in Afghanistan 
and Iraq correlated with a 
greater reliance on mixed 
contracting offices.
Study period for proportion and performance comparison includes contracts begun 
between 2007 to 2015
Hypothesis 4: Reach-Back Contracting
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Reach-Back Contracting and Likelihood of Termination or Ceiling Breach– Inverse 
Relationship
H4: The use of domestically focused contracting offices makes poor crisis-funded contract 
performance less likely
Results
H4 was not upheld.
• The domestic or international orientation of contracting offices had no significant 
relationship with the likelihood of ceiling breaches.
• In the terminations model, there was no significant difference between domestically-
oriented and mixed offices. That said, crisis-contracts managed by offices with 50 percent or 
more of their obligations performed abroad were 0.61 as likely to be terminated as those 
managed by domestically oriented offices (significant at the 1 percent level). 
Discussion and Conclusions
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• Overcoming reporting gaps makes clear that defense OCO contracting has declined quickly 
and then stabilized. 
• OCO contracts were not inherently at greater risk of termination or ceiling breaches, 
although disaster and Recovery Act contracts did correlate with more ceiling breaches.
• By contrast, civilian crisis-funded spending remains comparatively stable, even after the 
drawdowns.
• Contracting for disasters dropped off during the study period, perhaps due to a shift to 
grants or a decline in the quality of labeling.
• Contracting officers managing crisis contracts appear to be eschew use what the literature 
considers to be higher risk approaches. Crisis-funded competition rates are often above 
the rates in comparable non-crisis categories.
• Perhaps due to this conservatism, these higher risk mechanisms did not have worse 
performance for crisis-funded contracts than federal contracting overall. The exception 
was the higher risk of ceiling breaches for non-competitive awards using urgency 
exceptions.










Crisis=Recovery Act 2.18*** 1.85 2.57
Crisis=Disaster 1.41* 1.05 1.89
Crisis=OCO 1.12 0.93 1.36
Baseline = Comp w/2-4 
offers)
No Comp., Urgency 1.16 0.94 1.43
No Comp., Other 1.01 0.95 1.08
Comp. w/ 1 Offer 0.94. 0.87 1.01
Comp. w/ 5+ Offers 1.12** 1.04 1.21
UCA 1.73*** 1.52 1.97
Baseline= Cont. Office 
<1% Intl
Cont. Office 1-50% Intl 1.04 0.9 1.2









Crisis=Recovery Act 1.43*** 1.25 1.64
Crisis=Disaster 1.26** 1.08 1.46
Baseline = Comp w/2-4 
offers)
No Comp., Urgency 1.44*** 1.17 1.77
No Comp., Other 0.89* 0.81 0.98
Comp. w/ 1 Offer 0.78*** 0.7 0.87
Comp. w/ 5+ Offers 0.71*** 0.62 0.8
UCA 1.02 0.88 1.19
Baseline= Cont. Office 
<1% Intl
Cont. Office 1-50% Intl 1.31 0.95 1.82
Cont. Office 50%+ Intl. 1.13 0.71 1.78
Crisis-Funded Contract ModelFederal Contract Model
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1.      Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis










Crisis=Recovery Act 0.79 0.52 1.21
Crisis=Disastera 1.46 0.88 2.44
Crisis=OCO 1.08 0.84 1.39
Baseline = Comp w/2-4 
offers)
No Comp., Urgency 0.79 0.6 1.04
No Comp., Other 0.69*** 0.64 0.74
Comp. w/ 1 Offer 0.7*** 0.65 0.76
Comp. w/ 5+ Offers 1.28*** 1.21 1.37
UCA 2.16*** 1.81 2.58
Cont. Office Crisis % 1.06 0.99 1.12
Baseline= Cont. Office 
<1% Intl
Cont. Office 1-50% Intl 1.12 0.97 1.28









Crisis=Recovery Act 0.92 0.73 1.16
Crisis=Disaster 0.94 0.72 1.21
Baseline = Comp w/2-4 
offers)
No Comp., Urgency 1.19 0.89 1.59
No Comp., Other 0.57*** 0.5 0.66
Comp. w/ 1 Offer 0.65*** 0.57 0.74
Comp. w/ 5+ Offers 1.05 0.95 1.15
UCA 1 0.66 1.51
Cont. Office Crisis % 1.07 1.01 1.13
Baseline= Cont. Office 
<1% Intl
Cont. Office 1-50% Intl 1.31 0.95 1.82
Cont. Office 50%+ Intl. 1.13 0.71 1.78
Crisis-Funded Contract ModelFederal Contract Model
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1.      Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis
